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Introduction 
As media proliferate and become more integral to social existence, so too, it might 
be suggested, their role becomes more complex and contested. Media forms and 
representations are instrumental in the creation of deviant identities and the 
subsequent stigmatisation and demonisation of whole groups of individual. They are 
a driving force behind the nostalgically reactionary discourse that rails against the 
so-called ‘culture of permissiveness’, decrying the decline in respect and the loss of 
community. Yet they are also an important conduit for the celebration of diversity 
and the articulation and advancement of alternative discourses, counter-definitions 
and marginalised views and interests. Finally, they present opportunities to be social 
in new and novel ways. They offer a source of virtual collectivism and identity in an 
uncertain physical world; a source of imagined community. This chapter begins to 
explore some of the interconnections between crime, culture and community as 
they are played out in old and new media.  
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Crime, Culture and Community: The Late Modern Context 
In the past three or four decades, western society has undergone profound changes 
to its social, cultural and economic structures. Deindustrialisation, the globalisation 
of the manufacturing industries and the growth in service industries threaten to 
eradicate traditional forms of industrial labour. The emergence of new markets and 
economies has presented exciting opportunities, but also considerable problems. 
Sections of the traditional working class have been absorbed into the lower echelons 
of the middle class. Others have fared less well and face long-term unemployment 
and economic uncertainty. The felt sense of insecurity may be sharpest among the 
most socially and economically marginalised, but the middle-classes are not exempt. 
Much of the labour force is subject to short-term contracts, and rationalisation and 
redundancy are a constant lingering threat. Meaningful planning for the future 
becomes more difficult and, for some, all but pointless. The anxieties engendered by 
economic precariousness in a destabilised job market are experienced by all but the 
luckiest few (Hall and Winlow, this volume). As Bauman points out, the late modern 
human condition is characterised by ‘freedom of unprecedented proportions – but 
at the price of similarly unprecedented insecurity’ (2001: 159). 
 Pratt (2000: 431) notes that ‘in a climate of scarce resources, in juxtaposition 
to the offers of high rewards to successful risk takers, one’s neighbour or colleague 
becomes a rival or competitor; one’s social habitus comes to reflect less tolerance 
and self-control, and a greater likelihood of aggression’. Certainly, traditional 
conceptions of ‘community’ – based around geographical and territorial borders, 
shared values, identities and belief systems, collective politics – seem less applicable 
across much of the urban landscape. Societies are openly and expressively diverse. 
 3
Identity and membership are fluid. Populations are often transient, and constantly in 
flux. As Hancock and Matthews (2001: 111) note:  
 
‘In the context of increasing contingency, ambivalence and fragmentation the 
search for ‘community’ appears more hopeless and unrealistic. The 
identification of consensus becomes more elusive and the ability to mobilise 
universal truths in order to sanction, humiliate or stigmatise becomes 
increasingly difficult. The construction of order begins to look more artificial 
and fragile.’  
 
The problem of crime cannot easily be isolated from society’s other problems 
(Young, 1999). Definitions of and tolerance toward deviance and criminality interact 
closely with shifts in the wider economic, political and cultural environment. 
Individualism, competition and insecurity in the labour market, for example, are 
intimately related to the widely observed suspicion, mistrust and intolerance of the 
unknown other. The development of gated communities and the relentless 
monitoring and surveillance of public space establish clear boundaries between 
those included in and excluded from mainstream social and economic life (Davis, 
1990, 1994; Ferrell, 2002). Whole categories of individual are stigmatised, 
criminalised and excluded on the basis of their look, their style, their demeanour – 
their perceived ‘risk’ or ‘dangerousness’. Citizens are anxious and untrusting, acutely 
aware of and concerned about threats (both real and imagined) to their well being 
and personal safety. Crime consciousness and fear of crime run high.  
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 Fragmentation, surveillance, dangerousness, risk, exclusion – prominent 
features of late modern existence – may all be said to discourage social engagement 
and threaten traditional forms of ‘community’. Yet, paradoxically, it is precisely the 
atomising and isolating influence of these conditions that make the need for unity so 
vital. It is in this context that the role of media forms and representations is of 
particular theoretical and empirical interest. Amidst widespread ontological 
insecurity, individual life histories are structured, shaped, and made sense of within 
frames of reference provided, to a significant degree, by mass media, to the extent 
that a sense of shared (popular) culture generates ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 
1983). One important way in which people are afforded a sense of collective identity 
and social cohesion is via the mediatized construction of deviant and idealised 
identities. These constructions achieve much of their potency through the selective 
creation of binaries – the ‘idealised victim’ and the ‘absolute other’, a ‘utopian’ past 
and a ‘dystopian’ future. Both old and new media technologies present 
opportunities to engage collectively in the affirmation of virtuous identities through 
insisting on the non-identity of those ‘not like us’. These are the social conditions 
that serve as the starting point for this chapter.  
 
Media, Crime and the Deviant Other 
The popular press, more than any other form of mass communication, seem 
obsessed with ‘traditional’ conceptions of community and order, routinely 
employing nostalgically reactionary language and narrative forms to hark back to a 
bygone age of better times. Stories are replete with romanticised images of the 
family, the school, the institutions of criminal justice, and indeed, the state. 
 5
Permissiveness and a general decline in values – falling moral standards, a lack of 
respect for others, individual selfishness – are advanced unproblematically as the 
‘cause’ of society’s ills, while any reference to the impact of economic restructuring 
and destabilised labour markets is notable by its absence. Even the most cursory 
search through the headlines of both tabloids and broadsheets offers up a rich trawl 
of populist soundbites decrying the present, dreading the future and lionising the 
past, while ignoring all that was harmful, unfair, discriminatory or prejudiced. This 
perspective was encapsulated in an editorial by the conservative Daily Mail’s Simon 
Heffer (August 20th 2002): 
 
‘This Government has done nothing to reverse the trend towards lethal 
permissiveness. It has relaxed laws about censorship and legalised acts of gross 
indecency with young men and women. It has relaxed the drugs laws. It has 
made a virtue of ‘ alternative lifestyles’. Its permissiveness erodes the respect 
of individuals for others, cheapens human life, and results in a culture where 
the pursuit of gratification prevails, without any sense of responsibility for its 
consequences.’ 
 
The Daily Telegraph (January 9th, 2003), the UK’s best-selling daily broadsheet 
newspaper, insisted that society today is a much less civilised place than it was in the 
‘golden age’ of the immediate post-war era, and listed the following evidence as 
proof:  
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‘One marriage in three now ends in divorce. Almost 40 per cent of children are 
now born out of wedlock, the highest figure in Europe. Since the 1967 Abortion 
Act, more than six million unborn children have been aborted. The legalisation 
of homosexuality has not been the end of the chapter, but merely the 
beginning, with an aggressive “gay rights” lobby demanding more and more 
concessions. The policy of early release of prisoners has had a catastrophic 
effect on the safety of the general public… In addition to this, we must add the 
hundreds of innocent lives lost as a result of the abolition of capital 
punishment. The self-restraint and taboos of the 1950s have all gone.’ 
 
Located at the heart of the putative problem of social decline are various categories 
of deviant ‘other’; enemies ‘without’ and enemies ‘within’. On the one hand, the 
most allegedly serious and dangerous offenders – paedophiles and fundamentalist 
terrorists – are the ‘absolute others’, portrayed as being in society, but not of it. On 
the other hand, there are those whose transgressions may scarcely border on 
illegality, whose actions and behaviours are criminalised on the basis of some failure 
to conform with the ‘proper way of doing things’ – dole scroungers, drug addicts, 
immigrants and asylum seekers, homosexuals, single mothers and feckless fathers. 
These are the ‘stigmatised others’, portrayed as being of society, but not in it. I have 
explored elsewhere the enthusiasm with which sections of the press merge these 
criminalised identities in order to tar whole categories of individual with the same 
deviant brush (Greer and Jewkes, 2004). The key point to make here is that the 
deviant categories that feature so heavily are themselves often mythical 
constructions, created by and contained within a cyclically reproduced, reactionary 
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media narrative which becomes self-perpetuating in its vitriol against marginalised 
groups. 
 Columnist Peter Hitchens gave full vent to this style of reportage. With some 
considerable journalistic dexterity, he managed to link sexual permissiveness, single 
mothers, Islamic fundamentalism, crime and disorder, and the loss of community, all 
in the same article. The author began by lamenting the trajectory of a once great 
society careering ‘ever more rapidly down the path of permissiveness which began 
so gently in the sixties and now slopes ever more steeply downwards toward sexual 
chaos, drunkenness, family breakdown and the epidemic use of stupefying drugs’ 
(Mail on Sunday, November 2nd, 2003). He went on to stress the dangers of the rising 
Islamic population in Britain, proposing that:  
 
‘Official Islam may disapprove of such things but there have even been signs of 
the Muslim intolerance towards Christianity that is a nasty feature of so many 
Islamic societies…[A] Brownie pack leader was attacked…by young men who 
snarled ‘Christian bitch’ at her. An isolated and meaningless incident? You 
might hope so, but it would be unwise to be sure.’  
 
Conservative disapproval is ubiquitous in the popular press, and the impact of its 
unremitting articulation cannot be dismissed lightly. It is also important, however, to 
acknowledge that there are those who are trying to tell a different story, and that 
alternative viewpoints do find resonance. The Independent, for example, a liberal 
British daily newspaper, recently declared, ‘Newspapers Can be Dangerous at Times 
Like These… A Xenophobic Agenda Means Twisting Almost Any Story – And it’s 
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Getting Worse’ (April 4th, 2004). The narrative beneath this headline cautioned that 
linkages between issues like race, crime and immigration are often ‘tenuous and 
even dangerous’ and, further, that they can create ‘an overall tone which can stick in 
the public consciousness, particularly if there is an inclination there to make 
unjustifiable connections’.  
 In stark contrast to Peter Hitchen’s representation of all Muslims as potential 
thugs, criminals and terrorists, some journalists highlight the experience of Muslims 
as victims. ‘The Rising Tide of Islamophobia in Britain’ (Independent, June 3rd, 2004) 
called attention to the ‘upsurge in attacks on Muslims and their places of worship’. 
The article was critical of the ‘sensationalist press’ for fuelling animosity, and of the 
police for being ‘quick to claim credit for foiling terror attacks, but when all the 
suspects are released without charge… they seem to have little interest in setting the 
record straight’. It continued, ‘while Osama bin Laden and his acolytes may consider 
themselves devout Muslims, there is nothing Islamic about the carnage they have 
caused. Britain’s Muslims know this to be true, and it is high time everyone else 
accepted it too.’ 
 This level of media reflexivity provides a useful corrective to the reductionist 
stance – the construction of deviant identities, and promotion of simplified binaries 
– evident in so much reportage. Alternative discourses create a vital space within 
which counter-definitions can compete and find resonance in the public imagination. 
They encourage the selective celebration of diversity and difference, rather than its 
fearful condemnation. In a climate of heightened sensitivity to the risk of terror 
attacks, the issues of immigration and asylum, crime and disorder, and wider social 
decline are all too easily linked in stigmatising and exclusionary polemics, and in the 
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public imagination. Those commentators who would present alternative views, 
including those who themselves are the focus of stigmatisation and exclusion, 
continue to face an uphill struggle. But it is in precisely this context that the 
importance of their contributions increases.  
 
Media, Crime and Victims 
The media stigmatisation and demonisation of marginalised groups is not a new 
phenomenon, though the characteristics of particular deviant categories and how 
they are constructed and merged may vary over time (Pearson, 1983). The increasing 
focus on victims of crime, however, is comparatively recent. Over the last twenty 
years in the UK, victims have moved from the margins to centre stage in political and 
media discourses. The victim-centricity of current crime talk and policymaking 
reflects the general rise in crime consciousness and concern about personal safety. It 
also reflects wider social and political concerns about victims needs and rights which 
gathered momentum throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Maguire and Pointing, 1988; 
Garland, 2000).  
 The foregrounding of crime victims in the media is one of the most significant 
qualitative changes in representations of crime and control in the post-War period 
(Reiner et al., 2000a, b). Contemporary narratives, whether print or broadcast, 
broadsheet or tabloid, conservative or liberal, not only invite, but actively encourage 
consumers to identify and empathise with victims of crime: to see what they are 
seeing and feel what they are feeling; to become involved emotionally and join in 
the condemnation and punishment of the offender, who is increasingly portrayed as 
evil and beyond redemption. These emotional and expressive adaptations – 
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empathising with the victim, demonising and denouncing the other, both articulated 
and reinforced in mediatized discourses – comprise key constituents of the 
repertoire people use to negotiate the problem of crime, and the wider and 
inseparable problems of anxiety and uncertainty, that late modernity throws up. The 
playing out of these adaptations in the context of an uncertain physical world raises 
interesting questions about membership, identity, collectivism, and community. 
 The current phase in our history, as a number of commentators have 
observed, is characterised by people living together in segregated fashion, mixing 
but not socialising, sharing physical space (to a point), but little else. Sennett (1991) 
describes the indifference with which urban dwellers regard one another, the 
palpable sense of detachment and separation as they go about their daily lives. 
Taylor (1999: 64) has noted the ‘startling decline in the level of any form of voluntary 
activity (and indeed any kind of shared public activities other than sport) ‘in the 
community’’. The rugged individualism of neocapitalism, it is suggested, has 
contributed to the creation of societies inhabited by ‘lightly engaged strangers’ 
(Young, 1990). To the extent that this is true, the collective expressiveness and 
emotionality essential to social interaction – and the empathising with crime victims 
actively encouraged in media discourses –  would seem to risk suffocation beneath 
insecurity, indifference and social withdrawal.  
 
Media, Crime and Collectivism 
That there are new and emerging relationships between people and the spaces they 
both produce and inhabit is undeniable. Yet to suggest that people no longer take an 
interest or demonstrate any active involvement in their geographical communities is 
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to overstate the case. The thesis of the ‘stranger society’ should not be taken too far. 
In a climate of uncertainty, people tend to congregate around those issues which 
offer them some sense of unity and cohesion. Sport is one obvious example. Crime is 
another. While the identification of consensus and the ability to mobilise universal 
truths in order to sanction and stigmatise may appear increasingly difficult (Hancock 
and Matthews, 2001), some crimes are viewed as so utterly and unconditionally 
heinous that they take on an almost sacrilegious status. Child sexual murders are an 
interesting case in point.  
 Though all cases of child sexual murder are horrific, most capture neither 
media attention nor the public imagination with any force or longevity, and some 
barely register at all. Jewkes (2004), for example, notes that during the search for 
missing 14-year-old Milly Dowler in 2002, the body of a teenage girl was recovered 
from a disused quarry. Just as sections of the press were speculating that Milly had 
been found, the body was identified as 14-year-old Hannah Williams, who had 
disappeared a year earlier. Yet it was Milly who still continued to dominate the 
headlines, while Hannah was forgotten almost immediately. Milly matched the 
profile of the ‘ideal’ middle class teenager. Hannah was working class and had run 
away before. According to a police spokeswoman, her mother – a single parent on a 
low income – ‘wasn’t really press-conference material’. 
 Thus it is only those cases featuring a particular type of victim that will attract 
sustained media attention and collective public outcry. Those cases that journalists 
feel do not communicate the binaries of ‘innocence’ and ‘guilt’, ‘purity’ and ‘evil’ 
with sufficient force and clarity – even in the absence of a known offender – may 
scarcely feature in media discourse. Those child sexual murders that do, however, 
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have the capacity to invoke within media, public and politicians alike an intensity of 
reaction unrivalled by most other crime types. High profile and highly mediatized 
crimes of this nature provide a focal point around which people can unite to express 
collective feelings of empathy and suffering, sadness and hatred. In so doing, they 
present opportunities to establish a sense of membership and belonging – 
underpinned by the affirmation of virtuous and deviant identities – through the 
collective mourning of the ‘idealised victim’ and denunciation of the ‘absolute other’.  
 The murder in 2000 of Surrey eight-year-old Sarah Payne – a bright, 
photogenic girl from a stable and loving family background – by convicted sex 
offender Roy Whiting invoked near-hysterical media outpourings, and resulted in 
public protests and a series of vigilante-style attacks on suspected paedophiles 
(Silverman and Wilson, 2002; Evans, 2003). The killing in Soham in 2003 of Holly 
Wells and Jessica Chapman – school friends, again highly photogenic, with similarly 
bright futures and stable pasts – by school caretaker Ian Huntley also attracted 
sustained media coverage and public outcry. This tragic event is most notable, not 
for ensuing public violence, but for the sober observation of a semi-official minute’s 
silence nationwide. In both cases, many who were physically proximate left flowers 
and gifts, queued to sign books of condolence, and gathered in remembrance of the 
loss of sacred life. When the journalists and camera crews eventually decamped, 
physical artefacts of shared suffering defiantly proclaimed the togetherness of a 
community torn apart by tragedy. But messages of anger and sadness came from 
much further afield. In the midst of these tragic events those so inclined could go 
online to collectively offer their sympathies and support, and express their outrage, 
through specially established websites. Contributions came from around the world.  
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Media, Crime and Imagined Community  
Anderson (1983: 18) proposes that ‘All communities larger than primordial villages of 
face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined’. At a time when face-to-
face interactions in physical space and time appear to be negotiated with growing 
caution, notions of imagined community are especially resonant. The advancement 
and proliferation of communication technologies presents opportunities to be social 
in new and novel ways. In the network society (Castells, 1996, 2004), members of 
the ‘global village’ can engage instantaneously and continuously, sharing interests, 
building relationships, challenging or reinforcing values and belief systems, both 
marginal and mainstream. McLuhan (1964/2002) predicted that new electronic 
media, and the global flow of images, texts and meanings that they permit, would 
lead to the restructuring and reconceptualisation of relationships, and the re-
evaluation of how people interact (see also Feenberg and Bakardjieva, 2004). It is 
now possible to create virtual networks of connectedness neither bounded by 
geographical borders, nor subject to conventional restrictions of space and time 
(Rheingold, 1994). New forms of closeness and proximity are generated. New forms 
of collectivism and community are established .   
 In cyberspace, the negotiation of crime, fear and uncertainty merges with 
new media technologies in the creation of imagined communities structured around 
collective expressiveness, emotionality and identity. Of particular salience here are 
commemorative websites and global Internet books of condolence, and online 
petitions and discussion boards, established in response to high-profile murder of 
‘idealised victims’ by ‘absolute others’. Valier (2004) notes that online discussion 
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sites established in response to notorious UK and US murders are characterised by 
calls for excessive punitive justice and, not infrequently, threats of violence and even 
death to the perpetrators. Consideration of virtual engagement in the wake of those 
murders considered in this chapter adds further weight to this claim. When Ian 
Huntley was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murders of Holly Wells and 
Jessica Chapman, contributors to online discussion boards declared: ‘He will receive 
the treatment a ‘nonce’ deserves’; ‘I hope Huntley rots, may the bastard die of 
cancer’; ‘Let the justice commence’; and ‘Kill him’. 1 These online bulletin boards are 
also accessible to those who would challenge the promotion of vengeance and 
vigilantism, and offer an alternative interpretation of the ‘appropriate’ response to 
tragic murders. Oppositional sites are posted with a view to promoting, in the words 
of one website seeking to counter the dissemination of excessive online punitivism, 
‘reason and common sense in the UK’, and to ‘stop the madness’. 2 Even more than 
in the physically constrained, agenda-based world of the print media, messages 
transmitted in cyberspace are open to contest and debate. The challenge is to be 
heard above the resounding clamour of virtual fear and loathing. 
 These virtual discussion forums exist in parallel with and frequently, it would 
seem, in stark contrast to online books of condolence and memorial websites built 
around the shared suffering with and caring for victims and victims’ families. 
‘Guestbooks’ established in memory of Sarah Payne, Holly Wells and Jessica 
Chapman, and the victims of other recent tragic murders, 3 invite members of the 
global village to pass on their sympathies and pay their respects. As with online 
demands for punitive action and vigilante justice, passions and emotions run high. 
But what is most striking about these cyberspatial communications is the profound 
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sense of loss that contributors themselves – essentially complete strangers – claim 
to feel: ‘Words cannot express our sadness (UK)’; ‘They are candles in the darkness – 
their wee lives have touched the world (Australia)’; ‘I feel I have no words to express 
just how I feel’ (UK). The intense hostility and vengefulness invoked in so many by 
the tragic murder of ‘idealised victims’, while disconcerting, does seem to ‘make 
sense’ within the context of the wider punitive culture and penal escalation of recent 
decades. Why, though, in a society in which people are less inclined to engage and 
interact in physical space, and more inclined to be aggressive when they do, would 
so many wish to share in the pain and suffering of those they have previously never 
heard of, still less met?  
 Becoming emotionally involved with the victims of high profile, mediatized 
murders, participating in their suffering and sharing in their grief, is one way of 
outwardly and expressively demonstrating one’s depth of feeling – of proving one’s 
humanity – in a cynical and fragmented society. That compassionate empathy is 
being directed at strangers serves to amplify the expression of humanity still further. 
The sheer quantity and geographical diversity of contributions to memorial websites 
would appear to reinforce the visions of McLuhan (1964/2002) and Rhiengold (1994) 
of cyberspace as a forum for global interconnectedness and community based on 
mutual compassion, empathy and support. Indeed, virtual expressions of shared 
suffering may well constitute an invaluable source of strength and support for those 
who actually knew the victim. But while the majority of contributions are no doubt 
sincere, their authenticity bears greater scepticism.  
 Appleton (2002) likens collective involvement in mass mourning to a ‘grief 
roadshow’, and finds it deeply troubling that ‘it is not enough to feel upset – you 
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have to show other people how upset you are, and to join in with others who are 
feeling the same’. Collectively engaging and expressively sharing in the intense 
anguish of others – unknown others – conduces the development of an economy of 
suffering and pain in which members may compete to appear the most hurt and, 
therefore, the most human. It contributes to the ritualisation and commodification 
of grief, where grief becomes something to be conspicuously consumed, and then 
discarded; another commodity in an aggressive neocapitalist economy. Signing the 
book, visiting the website, leaving the message, all these things provide a fast-
working but short-lived antidote to the uncertainty and anxiety that characterises 
the late modern human condition – temporarily satisfying, but ultimately unfulfilling. 
The emotions diffuse, the murders are forgotten, the books of condolence close 
down, and the ‘imagined community’ dissolves away into cyberspace, only to be 
recreated, re-established, reconnected in the wake of the next murder featuring 
‘suitable’ victims and offenders.  
 Imagined communities established in the wake of high profile child sexual 
murders provide a source of identity and belonging, however superficial and 
ephemeral, in an age of uncertainty. It is scarcely surprising that so many want to 
‘belong’. Yet the extent to which this new collectivism constitutes social inter-action 
is questionable. Cyberspatial communications, as Wallace (1999) points out, retain a 
perception of anonymity. Messages of condolence and contributions to discussion 
boards may be signed ‘Tom, US’ or ‘Karen, Australia’, but seldom include more 
personal detail than that, and often include less. The virtual expression of shared 
suffering provides a way of touching a stranger’s life, of leaving a trace, without 
having to endure one’s own life being touched back by strangers in any palpable 
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way. It corresponds with a particular conception of proximity and closeness, but it is 
closeness at a distance. It is individualised sociality, anonymous and largely faceless, 
resonating with Agger’s (2004: 47) observation that ‘the postmodern condition is 
communicating with people whom you can’t see, but can imagine’. It is indicative – 
in keeping with discussions of social engagement, identity and collectivism in late 
modernity – of a climate in which people want some level of contact, and some form 
of interaction. But not too much.  
 
Conclusion 
As identities and meanings become more fluid and contested, populations become 
more transient, and citizens become more wary of face-to-face interaction, 
traditional forms of collectivism, sociality and community appear to fragment and 
disintegrate. New media technologies provide a means of achieving a sense of 
identity, belonging and community in this climate of uncertainty. One example of 
this new collectivism is the emergence of imagined communities in the wake of child 
sexual murders involving ‘idealised victim’ and ‘absolute other’. 
 Notions of ‘community’ – whether relating to the physical and traditional or 
the imagined and virtual – are, fundamentally, about membership and identity. As 
such, they are inscribed with notions of inclusion and exclusion. In the context of 
those issues discussed in this chapter – conservative and liberal counter-discourses 
about permissiveness and decline, and high profile child sexual murders – 
community derives from the collective affirmation of virtuous identities through the 
distancing from, and insistence upon, the non-identity of others. The distinction 
between identity and non-identity, however, and the process – both symbolic and 
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physical – of inclusion and exclusion, is not simply the distinction between victim and 
offender.  
 Imagined communities only emerge around particular types of victim. Those 
victims who cannot be ‘idealised’ – because their image or background does not 
match the preferred profile – will generally attract neither sustained media attention 
nor widespread public and political outcry. Their deaths may scarcely result in 
national recognition in the physical world, still less global commemoration and 
remembrance in virtuality. Notions of exclusion, then, do not only apply to those 
vilified in the press and condemned in online discussion boards. They apply equally 
to those child victims who do not fit the right profile or tick the right boxes, and who 
are therefore overlooked, ignored, denied. Thus imagined communities are created 
around binaries first established in news media discourses and, in this sense, form 
part of a wider process of inclusion and exclusion in which whole categories of 
individual may be legitimated or marginalised on the basis of such arbitrary factors 
as background, colour, or class.  
 By vicariously participating in the suffering of those affected or afflicted by 
child sexual murders – by sorrowing with their loss, and sharing in the anger that loss 
may invoke – people garner a sense of community, a sense of membership and 
belonging, in a world where the notion of community and community membership 
has changed fundamentally. Though these imagined communities are based on 
highly selective and exclusionary foundations, they can constitute a space for the 
promotion of compassion and empathy, and measured penal debate. But they can 
also stimulate the dissemination of vengeful hate, and contribute to the generation 
of an economy of grief, in which humanity is measured competitively, and 
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demonstrated through highly expressive, yet faceless, ephemeral and, ultimately, 
inauthentic gestures of suffering and loss. As such, being excluded is perhaps not so 
bad.  
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